President Joe Biden returned right here to Washington this week together with his administration touting the success of his day-long stopover in Hanoi, Vietnam, after the G20 summit in New Delhi, India.

Past a half-dozen funding agreements which supplied enterprise advantages for each side, Biden got here away hailing an announcement that the US had established a “complete strategic partnership” with the communist authorities of Vietnam – which Hanoi already has with China, Russia, India and South Korea.

He declared that the historic improve signalled that the US had “entered a brand new stage” in nearer ties with Vietnam. But, whereas US-Vietnam relations are undoubtedly much-improved in contrast with some a long time in the past, Washington’s strategy to Asia stays trapped in time.

The end result? It dangers repeating previous errors, with penalties for the US, Vietnam and the world.

Biden was the fourth American President to go to Vietnam for the reason that finish of the battle practically 50 years in the past.

I accompanied the primary. In November 2000, Invoice Clinton flew to Ho Chi Minh Metropolis and Hanoi to place an official stamp on post-war normalisation.

For 20 years after America’s ignominious withdrawal from war-devastated Vietnam, successive US administrations insisted on punishing the victors with commerce sanctions and rejections of regular diplomatic ties.

Clinton’s go to set the stage for 23 years of steadily bettering relations.

This newest go to was very totally different. It was much less about Vietnam and extra about Vietnam’s big northern neighbour. If it weren’t for China, I believe, Joe Biden wouldn’t have flown to Hanoi in any respect.

When observing this newest American foray, one can’t escape the 70 years of historical past since the US first grew to become embroiled within the area after the Vietnamese bloodied the French and despatched their colonial rule packing.

Then, the US took underneath its wing the nascent South Vietnamese authorities of staunch anti-communist Ngo Dinh Diem: the primary of America’s “Saigon puppets”, as Hanoi branded him.

In these days of the Fifties, America discovered motivation within the menace of ‘Purple China’ and extra broadly the ‘communist risk’.

The Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin had died in Moscow solely not too long ago, in 1953. Mao Zedong had taken the helm in Beijing in 1949. “The East is Purple,” proclaimed Mao.

The longer term was unsure. Communism was on the march. From Hanoi to Jakarta, it was mentioned, Southeast Asian nations would fall to communism like dominoes. Solely the ‘preeminent energy’ within the ‘free world’ might halt that shift.

Seven a long time later, the pre-eminent energy is not combating communism in proxy wars on battlefields in Asia. However related language remains to be getting used for what an growing majority of members within the US Congress describe as a brand new Chilly Struggle.

A Republican-led Home Choose Committee on the Chinese language Communist Celebration (CCP) says it’s exhausting at work investigating how the CCP poses an “existential” risk to “elementary freedoms” within the twenty first century.

What is absolutely meant by such alarmist language is that China threatens America’s superpower standing, that the world wants one superpower, and that moniker should stay hooked up to the US.

In March 2015, retired US diplomat and Harvard professor Robert Blackwill wrote a coverage paper that has turn into an unofficial playbook for in the present day’s American actions in Asia.

It begins with a exceptional however unsurprising premise: “America has constantly pursued a grand technique targeted on buying and sustaining pre-eminent energy over numerous rivals, first on the North American continent, then within the Western hemisphere, and eventually globally.”

The Blackwell paper argues that the US should “defend its systemic primacy” and spells out find out how to do it in Asia.

The paper maintains that China can’t be thought to be a “accountable stakeholder”. The CCP possesses its personal “grand technique” which seeks to “improve state management over Chinese language society and, past its borders, to pacify its periphery, cement its standing within the worldwide system, and exchange the US as an important energy”. The US subsequently should make certain China is aware of it could possibly’t have free reign in Asia. The Biden administration is using the 2015 Blackwell blueprint to the letter.

That’s the place Vietnam returns to strategic significance.

Using phrases like strategic competitors, the US has returned to thwarting perceived Communist ambitions because it did so clumsily via battle 70 years in the past.

Some questions are seldom requested in Washington.

Why ought to the US be the only superpower? Who appointed America the duty of thwarting Chinese language ambitions. Are these ambitions actual? How a lot of the world needs continued US dominance? Would no more nuanced, multilateralist positions on worldwide points, and constructing a multi-polar world order be a higher assure of peace and stability?

For perception into the American thoughts of the twenty first century, it’s value recalling a large of US politics of the earlier century, a determine now largely forgotten: Senator J William Fulbright.

Fulbright skilled a conversion in 1965, rising as probably the most eloquent opponents of the Vietnam Struggle and America’s self-selected function because the world’s most prolific interventionist.

He questioned the belief that Blackwell and most Individuals in the present day settle for – the concept of world preeminence.  He wrote famously of America’s “conceitedness of energy”.

“Energy tends to confuse itself with advantage,” wrote Fulbright. “An excellent nation is especially inclined to the concept that its energy is an indication of God’s favour, conferring upon it a particular accountability for different nations … to remake them, that’s, in its personal shining picture.”

It was an perspective that permeated US actions in Vietnam; an perspective that Individuals by no means unlearned regardless of repeated failures. The identical ‘particular accountability’ got here to be exercised once more in Iraq in 2003 and all through the 20 years that ended with one other ignominious pullout – from Afghanistan in August 2021.

The issue is that a lot of the world doesn’t view the US as an unequivocal power for good. And plenty of don’t share its view of China as an existential risk.

Look no additional than the current BRICS summit in Johannesburg, which noticed a number of nations – a lot of them US companions – queueing as much as be part of the China-led financial bloc. A lot of the world resists being drawn into a brand new chilly battle. They resist American alarmism.

As Fulbright mentioned so a few years in the past: “All of us like telling individuals what to do, which is completely all proper besides that most individuals don’t like being informed what to do.”

So once more, America is trying – as it’s with different nations – to attract Vietnam into superpower politics.

The excellent news for Vietnam is that it’s sturdy sufficient now economically to withstand being dragged on to 1 aspect or the opposite. It can keep its cautious balancing act, paying needed obeisance to the Chinese language with whom it should handle its territorial disputes whereas benefiting from the advantages of a more in-depth American relationship.

Maybe what the world wants is a number of “complete strategic partnerships” like Hanoi has with a number of nations. Or in different phrases, true multilateralism.

The views expressed on this article are the writer’s personal and don’t essentially replicate Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.